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Abstract: 
 
European Social Survey data suggest that dissatisfaction with national public services 
has direct negative effects on EU trust in most EU15 countries, but also that there is 
significant country variation in their actual magnitude. Two-thirds of this variation 
can be explained jointly by two macro factors: the effect is stronger in larger welfare 
states where elites and citizens may perceive EU-induced welfare state obstacles to be 
larger. Likewise, it is stronger in political systems where the most eurosceptic parties 
have tended to be the most welfare state-supporting ones. Under such conditions, it is 
more probable that citizens receive political cues conducive to a negative effect of 
dissatisfaction on EU trust. 
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European welfare states have become embedded in the multi-level polity of the European 
Union. But the precise consequences of this development are less than clear. Theoretically, 
several ways have been suggested in which European integration may influence national 
welfare states. The alleged effects are often negative and integration is typically seen as one 
of several destructive forces in motion. However, because actual policy-making remains 
firmly located at the national level, these are indirect and subtle forms of influence, the actual 
impact of which is questionable. 
 
Research on the topic can be divided into two broad categories. One group of scholars have 
for some time examined the interplay between integration and national welfare states (e.g. 
Leibfried and Pierson 1995; Scharpf 1999; Kvist 2004; de Búrca 2005; Ferrera 2005; 
O'Connor 2005). Using such studies as a backdrop, a second and smaller research program 
has begun to explore the integration-welfare nexus from the vantage point of citizens. In 
particular, a handful of studies have considered how attitudes towards future integration are 
structured by welfare state concerns. We know that citizens in countries with more social 
expenditure perceive a greater risk that further integration will entail a loss of social benefits 
(Ray 2004). Likewise, citizens of large welfare states and centralized wage-bargaining 
systems display more opposition to integration. In such contexts, furthermore, leftist citizens 
tend to be more opposed than others (Brinegar, Jolly and Kitschelt 2004; see also Hix 2007). 
Conversely, citizens of less-developed welfare states are more prone to embrace further 
integration, in particular those on the left. Finally, Europeans in large welfare states are 
particularly opposed to the future development of social policies at the EU level (Mau 2005a). 
 
These studies suggest that many Europeans have perceptions of how future integration would 
affect national welfare states, that those perceptions affect integration support, and that the 
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nature of perceptions varies systematically across countries. Taking these insights on board, I 
examine the extent to which actual dissatisfaction with the present performance of national 
public services and welfare state arrangements hampers—not only national allegiances—but 
also trust in EU institutions. To what extent do citizens already attribute performance 
responsibility to the EU in a realm that is formally a national competence? Is there variation 
across countries in this respect? If so, what institutional and political factors can account for 
that variation? 
 
I first outline the debate on the impact of European integration on national welfare states. 
Second, I describe a model of public opinion—the policy appraisal model—which establishes 
a framework for the prediction that national dissatisfaction directly causes euroscepticism. 
However, I also consider an alternative model—the domestic shortcuts model—that views 
such direct effects as unrealistic. Third, I explain how this paper expands on past research on 
EU performance appraisal among citizens. While many have focused on economic outputs 
and outcomes, I probe whether citizens evaluate integration also in terms of non-economic 
performance, which is more indirectly linked to European integration (if at all linked). In 
further contrast to past studies, I also model empirically political and institutional conditions 
facilitating links between national performance dissatisfaction and EU trust. 
 
The empirical part of the paper applies multilevel models to European Social Survey data. 
The results suggest that dissatisfaction with national public services has direct negative effects 
on EU trust in several Western European countries, but also that there is much country 
variation. What is more, two-thirds of that variation can be explained jointly by two macro-
contextual variables: the dissatisfaction effect is stronger in larger welfare states (where elites 
and citizens may perceive EU-induced welfare obstacles to be larger). Likewise, it is stronger 
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in political systems where the most eurosceptic parties also tend to be the most welfare state-
supporting ones. Under such conditions, I theorize, it is more probable that citizens receive 
elite messages conducive to a negative effect of dissatisfaction on EU trust. 
 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND WELFARE STATES 
 
A frequent starting point is Scharpf’s (1999; 2002) thesis that the institutional construction of 
the EU carries “a neo-liberal bias” (see also Leibfried and Pierson 1995; Gustavsson, 
Oxelheim and Wahl 2004). While the union has achieved much in terms of economic 
integration and removal of obstacles for free trade (so-called negative integration), issues 
related to spending, taxation and social policy (positive integration) reside at the national 
level. This division of labour, coupled with the fact that EU legislation takes precedence over 
national legislation, has created a constitutional imbalance: whereas the legitimacy of national 
polities typically rests on a non-hierarchical mix of market-promoting and market-correcting 
policies, such a mix becomes difficult to maintain when one domain is constitutionally 
superior to the other. 
 
One problem is said to emanate from the single market (see Scharpf 1999; 2002; Rhodes 
2003). Because of this market, member states can no longer use state-protected domestic 
companies as macroeconomic policy instruments to combat unemployment and thereby 
protect welfare state institutions from massive cost increases. Also, the free mobility of capital 
and labour may create a competitive downward pressure on labour costs and taxes, especially 
as tax bases become mobile. Similarly, “social tourism” on the single market is sometimes 
said to produce incentives not to offer generous benefits and services. Such fears have been 
bolstered by EU enlargement and high-profile ECJ rulings easing access to benefits and 
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services in other member states (Kvist 2004; Ferrera 2005). Yet other effects of integration 
are said to emanate from the stability and growth pact of the monetary union (EMU) (Palier 
2003). The EMU has removed macroeconomic policy instruments related to exchange rates 
and interest rates from the national level. Its emphasis on budget discipline arguably makes 
the short-term risk of unemployment larger, as member states find it harder to increase public 
spending in recessions. 
 
Most of these arguments are contested. Some point to signs that the EU has begun to play a 
more active role in social policy. Positive integration increasingly supplements negative 
integration. Not least “the open method of co-ordination” (OMC) has been launched as a 
context in which member states can establish common policy goals and benchmarks to 
facilitate improvements (e.g. Atkinson 2002; de la Porte and Pochet 2002; O'Connor 2005). 
So far the OMC has, with varying degrees of scope and success, been applied to areas such as 
employment, pensions, and social exclusion. 
 
But also the more indirect negative effects of integration are disputed. Some argue that any 
such consequences are dwarfed by other internal and external forces including demographic 
changes and post-industrialization (Pierson 2001; Moravcsik and Sangiovanni 2003). 
Similarly, Rhodes (2003) argues that there is little evidence of “social dumping,” whereby 
firms create a downward pressure on taxes, benefits, and labour market protection. Decisions 
of both investors and political actors are affected by a multitude of factors, each of which is 
notoriously hard to calculate. Such arguments are buttressed by comparative public policy 
studies failing to find radical welfare retrenchment. One case in point is that low-cost member 
states hesitate to exploit their advantages: in several southern European countries, welfare 
state policies have been significantly improved at the same time as the single market and the 
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EMU have developed. On a more general level, comparative analyses suggest that even 
though non-negligible retrenchment has occurred (Korpi and Palme 2003; Allan and Scruggs 
2004), more radical system change usually fails to attract sufficient support (Svallfors and 
Taylor-Gooby 1999; Kuhnle 2000; Pierson 2001; Swank 2002). 
 
POLICY APPRAISAL OR DOMESTIC SHORTCUTS? TWO MODELS OF EU SUPPORT 
 
The analyses in this paper are an application, but also expansion, of the policy appraisal 
model. While its core assumptions have been examined in several studies (i.e. Jenssen, 
Gilljam and Pesonen 1998; Marsh 1999; Mau 2005b; Hix 2007), it has been most rigorously 
formulated and tested by Gabel (1998). His model has three building blocks. First, it makes a 
distinction between utilitarian and affective types of support (cf. Easton 1975). The former is 
instrumental and cognitive in character: it is dependent on short-term results, and on benefits 
and burdens induced by the political system. In contrast, affective support is more stable and 
emotionally strong and is created by slow socialization processes, rather than by swift 
interest- and output-based revision. Further, the two types of support are thought to be 
inversely related. As one increases it suppresses the other. Hence, individuals who hold strong 
affective system support are not much influenced by short-term benefits and outputs of the 
system. 
 
This leads to the second building block of the model: Exactly because few Europeans hold 
strong emotional attachments to the European political level, support for integration becomes 
highly dependent on short-term outputs and benefits. Moreover, these are assumed to be 
economic in nature, as European integration has to a large degree been focused on economic 
integration: “European integration has been primarily an economic enterprise, focusing on the 
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implementation of policies that create and maintain a single market […] In evaluating the 
performance and perceived benefits from EU membership, I expect citizens to focus on the 
consequences of these economic policies.” (Gabel 1998:37) 
 
The third building block concerns the process by which citizens connect their orientations to 
interests derived from integration. Empirical research has found the average citizen to be 
uninterested and uninformed about European integration (see Anderson 1998). It is therefore 
not reasonable to assume that citizens themselves calculate costs and benefits emanating from 
integration. Rather, they need help by more informed agents. People follow ready-made cues 
as to how their interests are affected, as interpreted by political elite actors such as trusted 
parties, politicians, interest organizations, and experts. In this way, the model assumes that 
EU interests are articulated and politicized which explains how “EU citizens form these 
utilitarian appraisals without a sophisticated understanding of the economics and politics of 
European integration.” (Gabel 1998:12). 
 
Like the policy appraisal model, the domestic shortcuts model assumes low levels of EU-
related knowledge, information, and motivation. However, whereas the policy appraisal 
model relies on elite cuing to make interest-based attitudes realistic, the domestic shortcuts 
model views them as altogether improbable. Instead, it claims that citizens—knowing and 
caring little about the EU—fall back on more developed domestic orientations so as to take 
“shortcuts” to EU opinions (see Anderson 1998). 
 
For example, uninformed citizens tend to use the position of the preferred party as a reference 
point (Campbell et al. 1960; Zaller 1992). In a related vein, it has been shown that domestic 
government parties play a crucial role. Several studies conclude that EU-related referendums 
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have come to partly resemble confidence votes on the incumbent government, which 
represents the member state in the Council, and usually pushes the integration-friendly 
alternative. Therefore, government sympathizers are more likely than others to endorse that 
alternative (Franklin, Marsh and McLaren 1994; Jenssen, Gilljam and Pesonen 1998). 
 
A second domestic shortcut is national political trust, where citizens who generally trust 
national politicians and are satisfied with the functioning of domestic democracy are more 
likely to support integration. Under the shortcut model, this is because European integration is 
an elite-driven project (c.f., Wessels 1995; Schmitt and Thomassen 1999). Uninformed but 
trusting citizens may be willing to give political elites the benefit of the doubt, while 
uninformed citizens who are generally sceptical about elites will be less easily persuaded. 
 
Anderson (1998) provided a forceful test of the domestic shortcuts model (see also Fuchs 
2002; Kritzinger 2003). His starting point was the impact of macroeconomic conditions and 
perceptions on EU support that had previously been found. Against this backdrop, Anderson 
(1998:573) asked a pertinent question: “Given that virtually all measures of knowledge, 
awareness, and information about European integration indicate that people have fairly little 
systematic information about even the most basic aspects of the integration project […] how 
can mass publics be simultaneously ignorant about integration and act in a self-interested 
fashion when it comes to economic benefits to be secured from the integration process?”  
 
Consistent with previous studies, Anderson found that Europeans who evaluate national 
economic conditions favorably tend to be more pro-European. Of course, this may be 
perfectly consistent with the policy appraisal model, to the extent that people perceive that 
“Europe improves the national economy.” In contrast, under the domestic shortcuts model the 
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correlation rather reflects a process in which positive economic perceptions first have a 
positive impact on national orientations such as government support and national political 
trust. In turn, it is these domestic orientations that affect European orientations. In support of 
this latter idea, Anderson found no evidence of a direct effect of national economic 
evaluations on EU attitudes, once domestic orientations were controlled. 
 
In sum, the domestic shortcuts model and the policy appraisal model provide conflicting 
explanations of why national dissatisfaction may be related to euroscepticism. If the former is 
correct, there is no reason to expect a direct impact once appropriate domestic orientations are 
taken into account. In contrast, one should find such direct effects if the policy appraisal is 
right about elite-aided interest calculation being realistic. 
 
Previous research has focused on appraisal of immediate economic interests and evaluations 
of macroeconomic performance. This has been sensible as European integration was initially 
focused on economic integration and market liberalization. However, it is becoming 
increasingly possible that citizens evaluate integration not just in terms of effects on economic 
interests and outcomes. The suspicion was raised by Marsh (1999:106) who found that while 
a “largely economically-driven model accounted quite well for the national levels of policy 
satisfaction between 1983 and 1996, it was nonetheless evident that it performed less well in 
the second half of the period. […] It could be that citizens are evaluating the impact of the EU 
across a wider range of issues, not tapped in this model.” 
 
The welfare state/public service domain is interesting in this respect. Welfare state issues are 
almost universally high on the public agenda and national welfare state institutions typically 
enjoy stable and widespread support (e.g. Svallfors and Taylor-Gooby 1999). Furthermore, 
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we have noted the debate over negative implications of European integration for national 
welfare states. To the extent that elements of such theories have spread to the wider public, 
dissatisfaction with welfare state services may generate mistrust, not only at the national level 
(Huseby 2000; Kumlin 2007), but also at the EU level. 
 
TAKING ACCOUNT OF CONTEXT: THE ROLE OF PARTIES AND WELFARE STATE 
INSTITUTIONS 
 
Scholars often note that “many […] elites perceive the EU as being inimical to social welfare 
provision, and have made this aspect of integration a matter for public controversy” 
(Moravcsik and Sangiovanni 2003:130; see also Kvist 2004). Beyond such general 
observations, however, we have little systematic knowledge—let alone available cross-
country data—on how welfare-EU links are politicized in different contexts. Certainly, such 
cues are likely to vary in nature and intensity, not least due to the lack of consensus on the 
effects of European integration, and because EU- and welfare state issues play different roles 
in different countries. 
 
Research on EU attitudes is increasingly highlighting the interplay between parties and public 
opinion (e.g. Hooghe and Marks 2005; Hooghe 2007; Steenbergen, Edwards and de Vries 
2007; Gabel and Scheve 2007). However, we still know rather little about the specific impact 
of party cues on retrospective policy appraisal processes, not least in the welfare state domain. 
By example, Gabel’s extensive study (1998) demonstrated how benefits of economic 
integration structure EU support. But it did not consider empirically the assumed political 
preconditions for interest-based appraisal. This study aims to help filling this particular gap. If 
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evaluations of national welfare state outputs affect EU attitudes, one wants to know which 
political actors and contexts are conducive to such mental links. 
 
First, drawing on the policy appraisal model, the nature of party conflict may play a role. 
However, as detailed data on party messages in this respect are not readily available I present 
a more indirect way of tapping variation in how parties cue citizens. The hypothesis to be 
tested is that dissatisfaction will breed more EU mistrust in countries where the most 
eurosceptic parties tend to be the most welfare state-positive ones. The underlying assumption 
is that there are two ideological preconditions for parties to argue that integration hampers 
welfare states. One is that negative EU-welfare state cues should obviously be more 
frequently expressed by eurosceptic parties. Similarly, welfare state-supporting parties should 
be more likely to do so. However, it will hardly suffice that only one of these preconditions is 
fulfilled. The likelihood of such cues may only be really high among parties that are 
simultaneously EU-sceptic and welfare state-supporting. These are the parties that are likely 
to find such arguments particularly appealing, not just from an ideological standpoint, but also 
because their politicization sharpen the party’s profile. By letting the public know that the 
party is concerned about negative effects of integration on national welfare states, it is 
increasing citizens’ awareness of positions in two seemingly separate policy domains. This is 
advantageous as citizens, other things equal, are more likely to vote for a party whose 
positions they feel certain about (Alvarez 1997). Conversely, parties that are only either 
eurosceptic or welfare state supporting should be considerably less likely to provide negative 
EU-welfare state cues, as such cues would cast doubt on its position on either the welfare state 
or on integration. 
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The second contextual factor is related to the institutional nature of the welfare state. 
Specifically, citizens in welfare states with larger tax-financed benefit systems and public 
service sectors may perceive integration as a threat (see Gustavsson, Oxelheim and Wahl 
2004; Ray 2004). At least three types of reasoning might produce this pattern. First, to the 
extent that tax competition pressures certain types of taxation downwards this may be 
perceived as a greater problem in large welfare states with above-average taxation and 
expenditure. Second, social tourism may be perceived as a potentially greater problem in 
welfare states with more generous social protection conditions. Third, the perceived impact of 
the stability and growth pact may well be greater where social spending comprises a larger 
share of state budgets. In particular, more generous social protection may generate greater 
fiscal fears in recessions and times of high unemployment. 
 
DATA, MEASUREMENT AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The data come from the 2002 wave of the European Social Survey (ESS). It was conducted in 
24 countries in and around Europe, 14 of which are analyzed here.1 This data set fits our 
purposes better than other reasonably recent comparative surveys. Most crucially, it 
simultaneously contains a measure of EU trust and evaluations of welfare state- and public 
service-related performance. Specifically, the survey included two questions on how the 
respondent evaluated “the state of health services in [COUNTRY]” and the “state of 
education in [COUNTRY]” respectively, along scales ranging from 0 (extremely bad) to 10 
(extremely good). These two variables are combined into an additive welfare state/public 
service dissatisfaction index, varying between 0 and 10 with higher values indicating more 
dissatisfaction. 
 
 12
This index is meant to tap a more general evaluation of how public services and welfare 
arrangements tend to perform generally in the national context, rather than using them as 
specific indicators of the quality in only these two types of services. The underlying 
assumption is that citizens tend to evaluate the public sector and the welfare state as an 
overarching phenomenon, and that they generally do not keep meticulous track of specific 
areas. Incoming information about the public sector tends to be incorporated into an overall 
“running tally” (Lodge and Stroh 1993) of how public schemes and programs generally tend 
to work.2 One implication is that output evaluations of different policies tend to correlate. 
This is indeed the case for evaluations of education and health care (r=.51). In further support 
of the index, a previous study investigated the association between the same measure and 
national-level attitudes and behaviour in Western Europe (Kumlin 2007). Its relationships 
with incumbent government support and welfare state attitudes vary across countries in 
expected ways depending on contexts and institutions. This suggests the dissatisfaction index 
has some criterion validity in a cross-country setting. 
 
This study will focus on institutional trust as the dependent variable. Whether referring to 
“formal” or “informal” aspects of institutions, institutional trust is a key component in 
theories of regime performance and legitimacy, and is widely believed to matter for the 
survival and quality of democracy (e.g. Easton 1975; Norris 1999; Fuchs 2007). Empirically, 
past West European research suggests that national-level institutional trust is affected by 
policy appraisal evaluations in the macroeconomic (e.g. Huseby 2000) as well as in the 
welfare state domain (e.g. Kumlin 2007). In contrast, we know somewhat less about this 
particular relationship at the EU-level. 
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The best indicator of institutional trust in the ESS is an 11-point scale tapping “trust in the 
European parliament.” While the item is concerned with only one particular institution, we are 
interested in it by virtue of also tapping more general trust towards all major EU institutions. 
Fortunately, empirical validation using Eurobarometer data suggests this assumption is valid.3 
Trust in the European parliament correlates very strongly with trust in other salient EU 
institutions and should therefore function as an acceptable, rather than optimal, proxy for 
more generalized EU trust.4 
 
It is important to note that trust in the current institutional order should not be automatically 
equated with all other forms of EU support. For example, expressing trust in the current 
institutional order is not necessarily the same thing as wanting more future integration, 
thinking that your country has benefited from past integration, or thinking that the EU 
membership is a generally good thing. Of course, EU trust and such other types of support are 
likely to be causally related: if one trusts EU institutions one may well become more likely to 
accept that one’s country is a member or that the EU’s competencies/geographical area should 
be enlarged. Eurobarometer data are well in line with such an assumption, but it is also clear 
that EU trust and other types of support do not overlap perfectly.5 Hence, the findings of this 
study with respect to institutional trust should not be automatically generalized across all 
forms of EU support. 
 
A crucial feature of the data is that individuals are clustered within countries. Individuals from 
the same country naturally share experiences that make them similar to each other, but 
different from other citizenries, both in terms of the dependent variable, and in terms of 
effects of independent variables. Multilevel models capture such context variation by letting 
the intercept and b-coefficients vary at the country-level. Specifically, one can obtain 
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estimates of country-level error terms allowing for country-specific deviations in the 
dependent variable and in b-coefficients of individual-level variables. Also, the method 
estimates how the dependent variable, and b-coefficients of individual-level variables, are in 
turn affected by country-level contextual variables such as the nature of the welfare state or 
party conflict (see Hox 2002; Steenbergen and Jones 2002).6 
 
For several reasons, multilevel modelling is more suitable than standard regression for 
analyzing context-clustered data. A technical case in point is that standard regression tends to 
give biased standard errors for clustered data. Even more importantly, multilevel modelling 
simultaneously accommodates systematic contextual main effects and interactions, together 
with random error at the country level. Thus, the procedure gives a fuller and arguably more 
realistic account of contextual effects, and in turn less biased estimates. 
 
THE VARIABLE IMPACT OF PUBLIC SERVICE DISSATISFACTION 
 
Table 1 shows results from two multilevel models of trust in the European parliament. The 
first model displays the impact of public service dissatisfaction together with a number of 
control variables. The most important observation here is in line with the policy appraisal 
model: even taking the control variables into account, discontent with national public service 
institutions is associated with less EU trust. More exactly, model 1 predicts that a leap from 
total satisfaction (0) to total dissatisfaction (10) reduces European trust by .90 along the 11-
point dependent variable. With a standard deviation of about 2.4, it seems fair to say that the 
effect is rather decently-sized. This impression is sustained when comparing with coefficients 
for other independent variables that have been emphasized in the literature, such as education, 
government approval, and satisfaction with democracy. 
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 [TABLE 1] 
 
The second model controls for three “domestic shortcuts” of the type proposed by Anderson 
(1998). The first two of these are measured by 11-point survey items showing that approval of 
the national government (.03), as well as more positive views on the functioning of 
democracy in one’s country (.07), are positively associated with European trust. The third 
domestic variable measures the position taken on European integration by the party the 
respondent voted for in the last national election. The information comes from the 2002 
Chapel Hill expert survey (Steenbergen and Marks 2007). It was provided by country experts, 
using a 7-point scale where 1 means the party leadership is strongly opposed to European 
integration and 7 that integration is strongly favored.7 As expected, a more positive party 
position is associated with more EU trust on the part of the respondent (.09). 
 
Model 2 also tests whether the association between dissatisfaction and EU trust is direct or 
indirect. Interestingly, most of the total impact in model 1 remains when approval of the 
national government, satisfaction with national democracy, and party positions are held 
constant. This supports the policy appraisal model, which claims that citizens link policy 
outcomes to the European level in a direct manner, independent of domestic shortcuts 
 
However, the domestic shortcuts model is better at explaining the (rather weak) impact of 
economic evaluations. The effect of national economic evaluations in model 1 is entirely 
mediated by the three domestic variables. This means the data confirm Anderson’s (1998) 
conclusions in the economic realm. At the same time they suggest that a more direct (and 
stronger) impact of national-level evaluations is present in the public service domain. 
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 The random parts of these multilevel models yield some interesting observations. As 
expected, there is significant country variation in intercepts; that is, countries differ in the 
level of European trust (standard deviation .93). Furthermore, there is significant country 
variation in welfare state dissatisfaction effects (standard deviation just over .03). Later 
analyses will test if this variation is due to the size of welfare states and the nature of party 
conflict. 
 
A random intercepts-random coefficients model not only provides estimates of the overall 
variation in intercepts and regression coefficients. It also provides context-specific estimates 
of those parameters. Specifically, Table 2 shows estimates of the effect of dissatisfaction in 
the different countries. 
 
[TABLE 2] 
 
An impact of some substantive importance is found in most member states (model 1). 
Looking at model 2, one sees that this is true also controlling for domestic shortcuts. Thus, in 
most countries the main portion of the dissatisfaction effect is direct and is not reduced much 
when domestic political orientations are entered. Now, while there are significant effects in 
most countries it is equally important to note the large country differences. In countries such 
as the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Sweden, Finland and Belgium the predicted regression 
coefficients hover above -.10, effects that are clearly stronger than respected explanations for 
EU attitudes such as the positions or approval of the national government. In contrast, the 
predicted effects in Greece and Ireland are virtually zero. Other countries are found 
somewhere in between. This variation constitutes the challenge to which I now turn. 
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 WHY COUNTRY DIFFERENCES? THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS AND PARTY 
CONFLICT 
 
Table 3 reports an extended multilevel model that introduces two macro variables at the 
country level. Crucially for our purposes, the model not only estimates the main impact of 
macro variables, but also lets them interact with the impact of public service dissatisfaction. I 
continue to control for the individual-level variables found in Table 1, including those 
measuring “domestic shortcuts.” Thus, what is explained here is country-variation in the 
direct impact of dissatisfaction on EU trust. 
 
Looking first at the main effects of the macro variables, one notices a significant impact of 
social spending (-.16). This is consistent with past research suggesting that EU support is 
lower in larger welfare states. Here, an additional 10 percent of social spending/GDP is 
predicted to reduce EU trust by another 1.6 along the 11-point trust scale. Moreover, the 
social spending variable does a decent job in explaining the initial country variation in EU 
support (.56 here compared to around .90 in Table 1). 
 
Moving to the cross-level interactions, one should first note that the estimated remaining 
standard deviation in dissatisfaction effects has now sunk from .036 in model 2 to a .012 here. 
In other words, two-thirds of the initial variation can be jointly accounted for by the two 
macro variables. In fact, it is no longer significant once the interactions are included. 
Specifically, the impact of welfare state dissatisfaction depends partly on the size of social 
spending (-.006). This coefficient means that an additional 10 percent of social spending/GDP 
is predicted to increase the negative effect of dissatisfaction on EU trust by another -.06. 
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Consistent with the hypothesis, then, dissatisfied citizens in larger welfare states appear to 
blame Europe to a larger extent. 
 
[TABLE 3] 
 
The second interaction term lets the impact of dissatisfaction vary depending on the nature of 
party conflict. For this measure, I used data from the Manifesto Research Project, which 
provides information on how much emphasis parties put on various policy areas in their 
election manifestoes (see Klingemann et al. 2006). Two measures were used that tap party 
welfare state positivism and EU-positivism respectively.8 The correlation between these two 
measures was then calculated within each member state for the period 1992-2002 (Maastricht 
treaty until the year of the survey). In the calculation, manifestos were weighted according to 
election results, on the assumption that larger parties are more effective in communicating 
cues to the public. Univariate results for the two measures can be observed in table 4. 
 
[Table 4] 
 
The relationship between parties’ EU positions and welfare state positions varies 
tremendously. However, in a majority of countries such as Sweden, Spain, Germany, and 
others, there is a tendency for more welfare state-positive parties to also to be more 
eurosceptic. In contrast, the pattern is reversed in Austria and the UK where more welfare 
state-positive parties have tended to be more euro-positive. 
 
With this variation in mind, let us go back to table 3 and look at the coefficient of the second 
cross-level interaction term (.06). It shows that the more positive the correlation between 
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welfare state and EU support in a party system, the weaker the impact of dissatisfaction. 
Conversely, the tendency to blame Europe becomes stronger where the most welfare state-
supporting parties were more eurosceptic. By example, a dissatisfaction effect of about .06 is 
predicted to vanish entirely when we move from, say, Swedish or Spanish party conflict to the 
UK situation. This finding, then, suggests the importance of how elite actors have interpreted 
integration. Even holding the institutional environment constant, the nature of party conflict 
appears to matter for EU-level effects of national dissatisfaction. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES 
 
Research on welfare state attitudes and EU attitudes respectively has usually been conducted 
separately from each other. Perhaps exactly for this reason, we do not yet have an optimal 
data set for testing the hypotheses outlined here. Thus, this study has been forced to use 
survey measures that are either proxies (i.e. the dependent variable) or cover a limited part of 
the conceptually interesting universe (i.e. public service/welfare state dissatisfaction). Of 
course, I have presented conceptual and empirical arguments for why these measures are 
nevertheless interesting. In addition, the fact that hypotheses are clearly supported lends some 
credibility—not only to hypotheses—but also to operationalisations. Nevertheless, there is 
room for future studies using other designs and measurement procedures. 
 
Bearing such caveats in mind, the results suggest that dissatisfaction with public service 
performance fuels EU mistrust in many Western European countries. Moreover, unlike the 
claims of the domestic shortcut model, this effect does not seem to be an indirect by-product 
of dissatisfaction affecting domestic orientations, which in turn affect EU trust. Rather, 
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consistent with the policy appraisal model, dissatisfaction effects may be interpreted as 
evidence of more direct and conscious reasoning. 
 
These findings—especially if confirmed in future studies—offer a step forward in the study of 
EU attitudes. Previous tests of the policy appraisal model have focused on more obvious 
economic implications of European integration. In contrast, these findings expand the 
relevance of the model in that Europeans—despite being notoriously uninformed on EU 
matters—seem to appraise also non-obvious, indirect, and disputed repercussions of 
integration. In fact, the results suggest that public service evaluations are more consequential 
and have more direct effects on EU trust, compared to economic evaluations. 
 
I hasten to add, however, that there is great country variation in the actual strength of effects. 
What is more, both the nature of the welfare state as well as the pattern of party conflict seem 
to contribute to this variation. As for the former, effects are stronger in countries with more 
social spending. This may explained by citizens in larger welfare states perceiving a 
downward pressure on taxes and spending as involving more radical change. In addition, 
citizens of generous welfare states may be more afraid of “social tourism” on the single 
market, and may perceive the stability and growth pact as a larger problem. 
 
Political parties also appear to be instrumental in creating or disarming the dissatisfaction 
effect. Specifically, this paper has presented an early attempt to capture empirically the elite 
cues that are so fundamental to the policy appraisal model. Whereas previous studies have 
mainly assumed the existence of cues, our models have—with some success—included a 
proxy of country variation in cues. Specifically, the results support the assumption that 
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negative EU-welfare state cues are more likely to be spread by parties that are simultaneously 
pro-welfare state and eurosceptic. 
 
While the results strengthen the suspicion that parties can shape EU appraisals, it tells us little 
about the nature of party cues themselves. Several interesting research tasks await here. For 
instance, do cues tend to touch on the common market, tax competition, the stability and 
growth pact, or “social tourism”? How does the balance between these topics vary across 
countries, actors, and time? A related avenue for future studies would be to consider how 
elaborated and well-founded elite cues are in different contexts. 
 
Similarly, we need studies of the role played by knowledge and information in EU policy 
appraisal processes. As pointed out, citizens display poor levels of knowledge and interest on 
EU issues. At the same time they are apparently evaluating the EU on complex issues where 
social scientists are deeply divided. How does this combination of poor information and 
complexity affect the tendency to blame Europe for poor performance? 
 
Here, a thought-provoking argument is made by Moravcsik and Sangiovanni (2003:130) who 
ask: “Is the European polity biased against the provision of social welfare, as Scharpf argues? 
There is no question, of course, that the constitutional order of the EU contains more explicit 
provisions and more permissive procedures for liberalization and deregulation than it does for 
common social welfare legislation or for the recognition of national social welfare systems.” 
However, the authors claim that a close examination shows that blaming European integration 
for unsatisfactory national performance is either plain wrong or, at the very least, that any 
pressure emanating from integration is redundant in view of exogenous constraints. But 
according to Moravcsik and Sangiovanni (2003:133), this is unlikely to be discovered by 
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citizens. Rather, “public attitudes may be based on questionable information or assumptions 
about cause and effect.” Here lies a formidable challenge for future research. Do highly 
informed Europeans react differently to perceived deficiencies in national welfare states? 
Would highly informed Europeans really blame Europe less for national welfare state 
performance? 
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TABLES 
 
 
 
Table 1 Multilevel regression models of trust in the European parliament 
(unstandardized regression coefficients) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*p<.1
0  ** p<.05  *** p<.01 
 Model 1: 
Dissatisfaction 
+ control 
variables 
 
Model 2: 
Model 1 
+ domestic 
shortcuts 
FIXED PART 
 
  
Level 1 variables:   
Public service dissatisfaction (0-10) -.09*** -.07*** 
State of country’s economy (0-10) -.03*** -.003 
Woman .26*** .26*** 
Age -.01*** -.01*** 
Education (1-7) .01 .01 
Income .00 .00 
General political trust (0-10) .66*** .62*** 
Approval of national government (0-10) - .03*** 
Satisfaction with country’s democracy  (0-10) - .07*** 
Position on European integration of party respondent 
voted for (1-7) 
- .09*** 
   
Intercept 1.43*** .86*** 
   
RANDOM PART   
   
Standard deviation of intercepts at level 2 (SD of u0j) .93*** .92*** 
Standard deviation of public service dissatisfaction 
slopes at level 2 (SD of uwelfarediss) 
.033*** .036*** 
Residual standard deviation at level 1 (SD of eij) 1.75*** 1.75*** 
   
-2loglikelihood 69238.8 69082.1 
 
Comment: 17,453 respondents from 14 countries. Data from the 2002 European Social 
Survey. The analysis includes respondents from the EU15 countries, except France. 
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Table 2 The impact of public service dissatisfaction on trust in the European parliament 
(estimated predicted regression coefficients based on models 1 and 2 in Table 1) 
 
 Model 1: 
Dissatisfaction + 
control variables 
 
Model 2: 
Model 1 
+ domestic shortcuts 
Sweden -.13 -.11 
The Netherlands -.12 -.09 
Luxemburg -.12 -.10 
Finland -.12 -.10 
Denmark -.11 -.09 
Belgium -.10 -.08 
Germany -.08 -.06 
Spain -.08 -.06 
Austria -.08 -.06 
UK -.08 -.06 
Italy -.06 -.03 
Portugal -.06 -.03 
Ireland -.05 -.02 
Greece -.04 -.01 
 
 
Comment: Data from the 2002 European Social Survey. 
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Table 3 Multilevel regression model of trust in the European parliament 
(unstandardized regression coefficients) 
 
 
 
FIXED PART 
 
 
Level 1 variables:  
Public service dissatisfaction (0-10) -.06*** 
State of country’s economy (0-10) -.004 
Woman .26*** 
Age -.01*** 
Education (1-7) .01 
Income -.001 
General political trust (0-10) .62*** 
Approval of national government (0-10) .03*** 
Satisfaction with country’s democracy  (0-10) .06*** 
Position on European integration for party that respondent voted for (1-7) .09*** 
Level 2 variables:  
Social spending/GDP -.16*** 
Correlation between pro-welfare and EU-support in party system (post-Maastricht) .32 
Cross-level-interactions:  
Public service dissatisfaction X Social spending/GDP -.006*** 
Public service dissatisfaction X   Correlation between pro-welfare and EU-support in 
party system (post-Maastricht) 
.06** 
  
Intercept .92*** 
 
RANDOM PART 
 
 
Standard deviation of intercepts at level 2 
(SD of u0j) 
.56*** 
Standard deviation of public service dissatisfaction slopes at level 2 
(SD of uwelfarediss) 
.012 
Residual standard deviation at level 1 
(SD of eij) 
1.75*** 
  
-2loglikelihood 65064.6 
 
*p<.10  ** p<.05  *** p<.01 
 
Comment: Data from the 2002 European Social Survey. Entries are unstandardized regression 
coefficients. The analysis builds on respondents from the EU15 countries, except France. The social 
spending data come from the OECD, and are country averages over the period 1990-99. See main text 
for more information about other independent variables. 
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Table 4 The correlation between support for European integration and the welfare state 
among parties’ election manifestoes (Pearson’s r) 
 
 
  
 
Sweden -.67 
Spain -.66 
Germany -.50 
Portugal -.50 
Finland -.45 
Luxemburg -.38 
Ireland -.24 
Italy -.14 
Belgium -.08 
Netherlands -.07 
Denmark -.03 
Greece .04 
Austria .23 
UK .31 
 
 
Comments: Data come from the Manifesto Research Project data set (Klingemann et al. 
2006). Election manifestoes have been weighted according to party size. 
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ENDNOTES 
 
 
 
1 The 2002 wave of ESS is used as this is the most recent year for which manifesto data 
are available. The analysis includes countries that were EU members at the time 
(EU15). France was excluded due to problematic deviations in the wording of public 
service questions. 
2 Two rather different veins of opinion research lend credibility to this assumption. 
First, studies on welfare state attitudes suggest citizens tend to think about the public 
sector and the welfare state as overarching phenomena. For instance, attitudes towards 
spending on health care and education tend to blend in a more general spending 
dimension (Kaase and Newton 1995). Second, economic voting studies—the one area 
in which there is plenty of research on performance evaluations—imply that citizens 
evaluate economic performance as an overarching phenomenon although, in reality, it 
consists of potentially diverse trends and aspects (see Kumlin 2007). 
3 To test the validity of the assumption, Eurobarometer data from 2002/EU15 were 
used to correlate trust in the parliament with trust in other salient EU institutions. The 
results confirmed that at the individual level, trust in the parliament correlates strongly 
with both trust in the Commission (r=.78) and trust in the Council of Ministers (r=.69). 
Similarly, aggregate distributions of these different types of trust variables tend change 
over time in a more or less identical fashion. The data were drawn from the 
“Mannheim Eurobarometer trend file” (see Schmitt et al. 2005) as distributed by The 
Central Archive for Empirical Social Research (ZA) in Cologne. 
4 The question was asked in a question battery with other trust items, for instance on 
“trust in politicians” and the “national parliament”. Hence, responses to the European 
parliament item may be coloured by respondents’ sense of general political trust rather 
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than specific views on the European institution in question. The solution adopted 
throughout is to control for general political trust in order to try filtering out the portion 
of variation in the EUP item coloured by general orientations. 
5 Eurobarometer data from 2002/EU 15 show sizable, but not perfect, correlations 
between an additive three-item trust index (including Parliament, Commission, and 
Council of ministers) and classic general EU support items such as “membership 
good/bad thing” (.45), and “membership has been of benefit to country” (.40). 
Interestingly, trust in the Parliament shows slightly stronger correlations with these 
other items compared to trust in the Commission and the Council of Ministers 
(although the differences are very small). 
6 The multilevel models were estimated using STATA’s xtmixed command using the 
“unstructured” variance-covariance matrix option. 
7 Individuals who did not vote, or supported a party for which Chapel Hill provides no 
data, were assigned the country mean weighted by party size. Analyses that include 
only those who supported a party for which there is data do not change estimates. 
Finally, 1999 Chapel Hill values were imputed in the few cases where 2002 
information was not available. 
8 The EU support variable subtracts the proportion of EU negative “quasi-sentences” in 
the manifestoes from the proportion of EU positive ones. The welfare state support 
scale adds the proportion of quasi-sentences dealing with “social justice” (i.e. the 
concept of equality, special protection for underprivileged, removal of class barriers, 
need for fair distribution of resources, etc.), and the proportion of quasi-sentences 
addressing “welfare state expansion” (see Klingemann et al. 2006). 
